Products Liability Law Reporter - Vol. 26, No. 4, May 2007
Federal law does not preempt state law claims against mining equipment manufacturer.
Davis v. Eagle Coal & Dock Co., 640 S.E.2d 81 (W. Va. 2006).
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that federal law does not preempt products liability claims against the manufacturer of a roof bolter dust collection system.
Roof bolters are machines used to drill holes in the top of a coal mine shaft and insert bolts to prevent the roof of the shaft from collapsing. The machines are equipped with dust collection units, which collect and contain silica dust released by the drilling to prevent miners from breathing the dust. Dust collectors are heavily regulated under the federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq., and must be certified as "permissible" for use in coal mines. Davis and others sued the manufacturer of a roof bolter, alleging the machine's dust collection system failed to protect them from the silica dust, resulting in their development of silicosis. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the claims were preempted by federal law. The court then certified to the state supreme court the question whether federal law preempts plaintiffs' design defect and failure to warn claims.
Answering in the negative, the state high court initially noted that neither field preemption nor express preemption applies here. Section § 955(a) of the act provides that only state laws that conflict with federal standards for permissible dust collectors are preempted. Moreover, § 955(b) provides that state laws imposing more stringent standards than federal provisions do not conflict with those provisions. The court rejected defendant's argument that a statement in § 955(b) that the provision applies to health and safety standards "applicable to coal or other mines" refers only to the property from which the coal is mined, and not to dust collector manufacturers. Refusing to read this language so narrowly, the court noted that the act includes machinery and equipment within the definition of "coal or other mines." Even absent the statutory definition, the court said it was obvious that the phrase "applicable to coal or other mines" includes machinery that is integral to mining operations.
The court also rejected defendant's argument that conflict preemption applies, noting that this arises when compliance with both the federal and state regulations is impossible, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's objectives.
Compliance with a jury verdict that requires more stringent standards than federal law is not impossible, the court reasoned, noting that logically, compliance with a stricter state standard also indicates compliance with a less stringent federal one. Enforcement of a more stringent standard pertaining to dust collectors would not frustrate the act's purposes of protecting the health and safety of miners, the court said, reasoning that enforcement of a more stringent standard would better protect miners' safety and health by further limiting the extent of their exposure to hazardous silica dust.
Plaintiffs' Counsel
Guy R. Bucci,
Timothy C. Bailey, and
Dan R. Snuffer, all of Charleston, W. Va.
Gregory A. Lofstead, Charleston, S.C.
